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Social Solidarity and the Ontological Foundations of Exclusionary
Nationalism: Durkheim and Levinas on the Historical
Manifestations of Authoritarian Populism
C.J. Eland, Federal University of Minas Gerais, Brazil
Nicole L.M.T de Pontes, Federal Rural University of Pernambuco, Brazil
This paper seeks to explore the dynamics of contemporary authoritarian populism from a historical
perspective, relying on the approaches of Durkheim’s experimental sociology and Levinas’s ethical
phenomenology. By reading the works of these two thinkers in concert, a pathology is exposed within
this particular form of politics in that the State must necessarily close itself off to the critique of
exteriority. Our reading of Durkheim explores the social pathology of nationalism while our reading
of Levinas demonstrates the philosophical dimension of this pathology as the inevitable outcome of
any philosophical thinking which privileges ontology above all else. The way these thinkers address
these themes can serve as a guide as we attempt to overcome the same pathology today in various
forms of authoritarian populism that adopt the same mentalities and methods utilized by past forms
of this corrupted idealism. Keywords: nationalism, ontology, populism, Durkheim, Levinas.

Introduction
One of the great social theorists of our time passed away in July of 2019. Ágnes Heller
dedicated her life to shedding philosophical illumination on complex political and social
phenomena and in her last years she deployed her considerable talents in direct opposition to the
politics of Viktor Orbán, the current prime minister of Hungary. Heller’s legacy is that of a
political critic precisely because she refused to be drawn into philosophical dilemmas in which
opposing capitalism necessarily meant dogmatically supporting Marxism. As a survivor of both
the Nazi Holocaust and the Stalinist purges in occupied Hungary, Heller’s primary political
commitment was an opposition to totalitarianism in all its forms. Her first-hand experiences with
the barbarism of both left and right totalitarian governments lead Heller to build a career as an
outspoken critic of all forms of political totality.
One of the deep motivations of her work is the view that while philosophy has long
engaged with conceptions of evil as it has been formulated by religious thought, in the
contemporary world (beginning with Auschwitz) “demonic” evil manifests exclusively as
political evil. Against Hannah Arendt’s conception of the banality of evil, Heller argues that evils
committed or enabled by “demonic” agents become radical only when married to practical
political power. She notes that Nero, for example, “was a murderer on a grand scale because as
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Emperor of Rome he had the power to murder” (Heller 2011, 24). As the technology of cruelty
evolved from Nero’s flames to the furnaces of Auschwitz, the scale of atrocity within reach of
demonic figures expanded exponentially. This leads to the current situation in which “modern
demons are in full bloom only in the situation of power” (Heller 2011, 27). Heller’s approach
shows that philosophy is uniquely suited to exposing the machinations of evil, and further, that
in our time the evil most urgently vital to oppose is found in the political sphere of human life.
This is why, even in her final philosophical pursuits, Heller remained firmly fixed on opposing
and challenging the politics of Orbán.
Heller’s analysis of Orbán, which she offered in an interview on August of 2018, less than
a year before her death, can help us orient our discussion of authoritarian populism here. When
asked if she considered Orbán to be a “populist” she pronounced her diagnosis of his particular
pathology as follows:
I do not like the term populist as it is used in the context of Viktor Orbán, because
it does not say anything. Populists rely typically on poor people. Orbán uses
nationalistic vocabulary and rhetoric, he mobilizes hatred against the stranger and
the alien, but it has nothing to do with populism. It has to do with the right-wing,
but this is also questionable, because Orbán is a man who is interested only in
power… From the time he became the prime minister of Hungary, Orbán was
always interested in concentrating all the power in his hands. I would describe
him as a tyrant. He is a tyrant because nothing can happen in Hungary that he
does not want, and everything that he wants is carried through in Hungary. This
is a very tyrannical rule… Everyone who is under Orbán must serve him and must
agree with him. No counter opinion is tolerated because this is a mass society, not
a class society (Heller 2018).
This mentality of total concentration of power that Heller diagnoses in Orbán is certainly not
limited to Hungarian politics nor is it only found within western countries. Rather, this same
pathology can be seen as a worldwide movement that has encompassed China, Russia, Egypt,
Turkey, Brazil, England and the United States. Heller remained committed throughout her life to
the task of deploying the full force of philosophical rigor against this pathology and the kind of
tyranny she denounced in figures such as Orbán.
But here we might take issue with Heller’s reluctance, in the passage cited above, to
identify the populist element of what she calls Orbán’s mobilization of “hatred against the
stranger and the alien,” which she argues “has nothing to do with populism”. In our view, Heller
underestimates the way that contemporary authoritarian populism mobilizes and exploits
contempt for those who are ethnically or culturally different from the hegemonic majority, not as
an incidental route to power but as a formal definitive characteristic of the movement. As will be
developed below, this exploitation is not as an incidental characteristic but rather is a necessary
and defining methodology of the movement. Further, this appeal to the basest aspects within the
human soul is inseparable from the particular kind of right-wing authoritarian populism that
Orbán represents and goes to the heart of the entire tradition of exclusionary nationalist populism
which can only comprehend social unity in terms of hegemonic cultural solidarity.
In discussing the kinds of solidarity which unite and divide the social order, we might
25
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well begin with the work of Émile Durkheim. While Durkheim is mostly known for his formal
experimental sociology, he was a politically active scholar who, like Heller, deployed the full
force of his academic research against the most serious political challenge of his day. For
Durkheim, that challenge was the rising force of nationalism in the early part of the twentieth
century. In the first part of this paper we will explore Durkheim’s very specific account of this
particular pathology. In the second part we will attempt to orient how this pathology relies on an
appeal to “elemental feelings” among the populace as an unmistakable component of past and
present forms of exclusionary nationalist populism.
Durkheim Against Nationalism
As one of the founders of classical sociology, Durkheim was primarily preoccupied with
the dynamic forms of social solidarity that rise and fall with historical and cultural changes.
While his work rarely addresses the particular political manifestations or exploitation of these
kinds of solidarity, we can see how these elements converge in his brief 1914 (republished in
English in 1915) propaganda pamphlet “Germany above All,” written against rising German
Nationalism at the outset of the First World War and. There, Durkheim elaborates a view of a
particular kind of nationalistic politics that persists today in contemporary forms of
authoritarian populism. Dominick LaCapra explains the context of the pamphlet within
Durkheim’s thought:
One important problem which the propagandistic World War I pamphlet Germany
above All emphasized was the crisis generated by a conflict between legal
imperatives and the demands of a humanistic ethic. Although the severity of this
conﬂict challenged his optimistic evolutionary assumptions about the nonauthoritarian and democratic course of law and government in modern society,
Durkheim's answer was unequivocal. In contrast to the school of juridical
positivism in Germany, which had exercised some inﬂuence on his early thought,
Durkheim without hesitation placed the humanistic conscience collective of modern
society above legal duties to the state (LaCapra 2001, 87).
This interest in the conflict between legal obligation and ethical obligation is a vital theme that
gets to the heart of the mentality of contemporary nationalism. This mentality harbors a deep
belief that the ethical order of human life can and must be subordinated to a conception of legal
accountability, which is more easily manageable by the State’s legal apparatus. What this means
is that ethics presents a threat to the authoritarian State as a realm that exists beyond its complete
control, unlike the legislative and judicial realms which remain within the self-contained logic of
the authoritarian State. Durkheim’s rejection of this absolute conception of the State rests on an
account of the primacy of collective moral consciousness, which he develops in great detail in the
pamphlet. Durkheim advocates for an almost Kantian position of European cosmopolitanism
against which Germany had rebelled. He emphatically accuses Germany of leaving the great
family of civilized people that comprises European society:
It is beyond belief, they say, that Germany, which yesterday was a member of the
great family of civilized peoples, which even played amongst them a part of the
first importance, has been capable of giving so completely the lie to the principles
of human civilization. It is not possible that those men, with whom we used to
26
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consort, whom we held in high regard, who belonged without any reservation to
the same moral community as we ourselves, have been capable of becoming those
savage creatures, aggressive and unconscionable, whom we hold up to public
indignation (Durkheim 1915, 3-4).
Durkheim goes on to examine the way in which this withdrawal from collective civilized morality
can be understood through a particular German mentality embodied in the work of Heinrich
Treitschke. Durkheim explains Treitschke’s views of an exaggerated independence released from
all limitation and reservation that culminates in the absolute State. Relying on this conception of
exaggerated independence of the absolute State, Durkheim notes that for Treitschke, “the State is
autarkès (self-sufficient), in the sense which the Greek philosophers gave to that word; it must be
completely self-sufficient; it has, and ought to have, need only of itself, to exist and to maintain
itself; it is an absolutism (8, translation modified). This definition of the State as absolute selfsufficiency, of the utter closing off to the critique of exteriority, is the foundation of Treitschke’s
political theory and serves as the forerunner to contemporary populist movements of radical
exaggerated nationalist sovereignty.
Durkheim focuses on Treitschke’s rejection of international law, or more specifically, his
view that international law or treaties cannot be binding since a State cannot admit an authority
superior to itself. Unlike contracts between individuals, who can and must yield to the superior
authority of the State, contracts between States can have no such external force of law. Durkheim
summarizes this point in Treitschke’s view of the State:
Whilst in contracts between private persons there is at the base a moral power
which controls the wills of the contracting parties, international contracts cannot
be subject to this superior power, for there is nothing above the will of a State. This
follows not only when the contract has been imposed by force, as the sequel of a
war, but not less when it has been accepted by a free choice (Durkheim 1915, 10).
Durkheim’s point is that while relations between individuals are guided or at least limited by
ethical responsibility, no such mechanism exists in international relations. The Kantian
cosmopolitanism of European morality, the great family which Germany has decided to leave
behind, offered one way of solidifying a trans-national morality, which has subsequently been
lost due to German aggression. Durkheim diagnoses the imminent threat to all of western
civilization within Treitschke’s doctrine of the absolute State as the inevitability and necessity of
war which necessarily accompanies this mentality. Because competing interests and rivalry will
undoubtedly arise between States that are equally unrestrained by the moral power which
compels contracting parties, the inevitable result will be war since the States cannot yield to the
arbitration of any external authority. Moreover, those nations incapable of imposing their
collective will onto other nations cannot rightfully be called States, he continues:
Without war, the State is not even conceivable. Again the right of making war at
its own will constitutes the essential quality of sovereignty. It is by this right that
it is distinguished from all other human associations. When the State is no longer
in a position to draw the sword at its will, it no longer deserves the name of State
(Durkheim 1915, 12).
Thus, in Treitschke’s view of the State, since there is no distinction between politics and war, the
27
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essential quality of sovereignty is the power to make war. But Durkheim diagnoses the pathology
of Treitschke’s absolutism as not only the inevitability of war, but in the sanctity with which
warfare becomes invested. Warfare itself becomes sacred in two ways: first as a necessary
condition for the existence of the State, which is in turn necessary for the survival of its citizens,
and second as the actual embodiment of moral virtues. Durkheim explains, quoting Treitschke at
length:
War is not only inevitable, it is moral and sacred. It is sacred first because it
represents a condition necessary to the existence of Slates, and without the State
humanity cannot live. "Apart from the State, humanity cannot breathe". But it is
sacred also, because it is the source of the highest moral virtues. It is war which
compels men to master their natural egoism; it is war which raises them to the
majesty of the supreme sacrifice, the sacrifice of self. By it, individual wills, instead
of dissipating themselves in the pursuit of sordid ends, are concentrated on great
causes, and "the petty personality of the individual is effaced and disappears
before the vast perspective envisaged by the aspirations of the State". By war, "man
tastes the joy of sharing with all his compatriots, learned or simple, in one and the
same feeling, and whosoever has tasted that happiness never forgets all the
sweetness and comfort that it yields". In a word, war connotes "a political
idealism", which leads a man forward to surpass himself. Peace, on the contrary,
is "the reign of materialism;" it is the triumph of personal interest over the spirit of
devotion and sacrifice, of the mediocre and sordid over the noble life (Durkheim
1915, 12-3).
This inversion of morality functions in accord with the logic of Durkheim’s account of the sacred
in that it makes war itself sacred and selfless while peace is seen as profane and egoistic.
Durkheim could not have anticipated the degree to which war propaganda would be
perfected during the twentieth century in order to ensure this moral inversion, although his work
already explains the fundamental principles by which it will function. Following this “political
idealism”, the State itself becomes a personality, which Durkheim notes is necessarily “a
personality, imperious and ambitious, impatient of all subjection, even of the appearance of
subjection : it is only really itself in proportion to the measure in which it belongs completely to
itself” (13). The State’s inability to admit a power beyond itself, to close over into totality, forces
the State to collapse all conception of power into the State itself. Weaker States are inevitably
dominated as their dependence on others negates their absolute sovereignty. Durkheim
continues: “A weak State naturally falls into dependence on another, and, in proportion as its
sovereignty ceases to be complete, it ceases itself to be a State. Whence it follows that the element,
which essentially constitutes a State, is Power. Der Staat ist Macht — this axiom, which constantly
falls from the pen of Treitschke, dominates all his teaching” (14). This view that the State is Power
is the underlying logic to all of Treitschke’s politics and ultimately collapses the distinction
between politics and war at a fundamental level. This necessarily implies that smaller countries
who lack the physical strength to defend and maintain themselves in conflict against their
stronger or more aggressive neighbors, cannot properly be understood as States. Thus, powerful
States who are “true” States by virtue of that power, have no moral or legal obligation to respect
the rights of weaker non-States who have no legitimate claim to their own sovereignty.
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Durkheim is especially interested in the way the State subordinates and must subordinate
all morality to its own immediate necessities. One of the central claims of Durkheim’s pamphlet
is that German nationalism in particular harbors a notable aversion to any morality which resides
beyond the totality of the State. Any external or universal morality, such as Kantian
cosmopolitanism, which could serve as a critique of the State, would be a threat to the absolute
sovereignty which Treitschke insists is the essential characteristic of the State. Durkheim
elaborates that the way that Treitschke responds to the potential challenge to the sovereignty of
the State posed by morality is via a return to Machiavelli as a thinker who “did not hesitate to
maintain that the State is not under the jurisdiction of the moral conscience, and should recognise
no law but its own interest” (18). This view of the State as a closed totality, unbound by any
external morality is rediscovered by Treitschke and other German nationalists seeking to solidify
the absolute sovereignty of the State which is above all moral critique. Of course, acting in a moral
way may well suit the interests of the State, to gain a reputation for trustworthiness might
enhance the political power of the State, for example. But Durkheim makes clear that in this
Treitschkean-Machiavellian conception of the relation of morality to the State, all morality serves
the single purpose of reinforcing the State’s authority, which is to say, to increase the Power of
the State. Increasing the Power of the State becomes the Supreme Good, above all else within the
moral schema dictated by the exaggerated independence of the absolute State. Durkheim notes:
Here we have a logical demonstration of the famous formula the German learns
to repeat from his earliest childhood : Deutschland über alles; for the German there
is nothing above the German State. The State has but one duty : to get as large a
place in the sun as possible, trampling its rivals under foot in the process. The
radical exclusion of all other ideals will rightly be regarded as monstrous
(Durkheim 1915, 23).
Because the absolute self-sufficiency and autonomy of the State can admit no higher power, this
would seem to necessarily enter into conflict with any claim of universal values, especially those
of religion when not subordinated to the State. Monotheism presents an especially problematic
challenge since the God of monotheistic religions does not refer to a particular God of a tribe or a
city, but to the God of the entire human race, a universal lawgiver and guarantor of an absolute
morality which applies to all of humanity. It is in respect to this monotheistic conception of the
divine that Durkheim writes: “Now the very idea of this God is alien to the mentality which we
are studying” (24). While nationalists like Treitschke often claim divine or religious moral
grounding of their political ideology, Durkheim views any admission of a divinity beyond the
State as merely a “formal reservation.”
For Durkheim, this denotes the total inversion of the sacred dimension of human life, the
interconnectedness of social solidarity, which is entirely supplanted by the political objectives of
the State. But this is not a suspension of morality in a Kierkegaardian sense of obligations to the
State forcing us to renounce or suspend conflicting beliefs that we know to be morally right.
Rather, this “political idealism” represents a new morality taking the place of the old morality,
which is then cast as weak and decadent since it contributes nothing to the one true duty of the
State, which is to increase its power. This new morality does not only guide the actions of the
State at the international level, but also in terms of the regulation of the internal life of society.
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Thus, Treitschke represents not only the elevation of the State over morality, but more
fundamentally over civil society itself. Durkheim makes clear the source of this antagonism:
To designate what we call the People as distinguished from the State, Treitschke
and a number of other German theorists prefer the term Civil Society (die
bürgerliche Gesellschaft). Civil Society includes everything in the nation which is not
immediately connected with the State, the family, trade and industry, religion
(when this is not a department of the State), science, art. All these forms of activity
have this characteristic in common, that we embrace them voluntarily and
spontaneously. They have their origin in the natural inclinations of man. Of our
own free will we found a family, love our children, work to satisfy their material
wants and our own, seek after truth, and enjoy aesthetic pleasures. Here we have
a whole life which develops without the intervention of the State (Durkheim 1915,
27).
This voluntary spontaneity cannot be incorporated into the mechanism of the State, and thus
presents a necessary antagonism. This civil society is what resists the pressure of the State’s
single-minded pursuit of its own totalization. This realm of civil life which is prior to the State,
and thus exists outside the purview of its authority, Durkheim describes as:
… a mosaic of individuals and of separate groups pursuing divergent aims, and
the whole formed by their agglomeration consequently lacks unity. The
multiplicity of relations that connect individual with individual, or group with
group do not constitute a naturally organised system. The resulting aggregate is
not a personality; it is but an incoherent mass of dissimilar elements. [Treitschke]
"Where is the common organ of Civil Society? There is none. It is obvious to
everyone that Civil Society is not a precise and tangible thing like the State. A State
has unity; we know it as such; it is not a mystic personality. Civil Society has no
unity of will” (Durkheim 1915, 28, translation modified).
As an “incoherent mass of dissimilar elements”, the diverse mosaic of civil society presents an
antagonism with the absolute morality of the State, which demands unity, order and organization
above all else. Because civil society lacks a kind of spontaneous harmony or the authoritarian
imposed harmony enforced by the apparatus of the State, each of its competing interests will
invariably enter into conflict, resulting in the chaos of disorder, which is anathema to the
objectives of the State. The State, in turn, must inevitably resort to coercive action and
commanding obedience to impose order, making obedience to the State the first civic duty. This
does not require the coercion of belief, for Treitschke, merely the coercion of action, since the State
has no interest in the private lives of citizens, only external obedience to the formal law. He quotes
from Treitschke: “[The State] says: what you think is a matter of indifference to me; but you must
obey. Progress has been made when the silent obedience of citizens is reinforced by internal and
well considered acquiescence; but this acquiescence is not essential” (32). The silent obedience of
the masses, yielding to the power of the State not out of agreement but out of coercion, supplants
moral solidarity and fraternity. Since the first task of politics, in Treitschke’s view, is to assert its
own Power, this requires the overcoming of mere sentimentality and aversion to harshness on
the part of the sovereign. Durkheim further quotes, with evident distaste, Treitschke’s view that
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“Politics cannot be carried on without harshness; that is why women understand nothing about
them” (33).
It is this logic of Germany Above All, the logic of the State above morality, that allows for
unrivaled levels of brutality, as Durkheim describes German conduct up to that point during the
First World War. Durkheim notes:
… the individual atrocities committed by the soldiery are but the methodical
application of these principles and rules. Thus the whole system is homogeneous
and logical; a pre-determined concept of the State is expressed in rules of conduct
laid down by the military authority, and these rules are, in their turn, translated
into action by the individual (Durkheim 1915, 39).
At the level of individual action, atrocities are carried out not out of any particular malice or
hatred, but out of a systematic and methodological application of the self-sufficient mentality of
the State. Durkheim points to a connection between the State placing itself above both morality
and civil society in such a way as the actions of its agents (specifically soldiers in this case) cannot
be judged by any logic external to the State. Put another way, if the only good is the good of the
State, moral agency must be oriented around the single goal the State can have, which is to
increase its power. Thus, overthrowing weaker States, who are not “real” States in the sense they
are incapable of exerting their own Power, is the inevitable outcome of this radical autonomy. By
orienting all citizenship around the goal of increasing the power of the State, Treitschke opposes
the very concept of nationality in terms of the collective of social groups living under a set of
established laws. Powerful States, in pursuit of greater power, desire to impose order on these
non-States, via coercion rather than their consent. This, for Durkheim, explains German
aggression: “Hence the passion of Germany for conquest and annexation. She cares so little what
men may feel or desire. All she asks is that they should submit to the law of the conqueror, and
she herself will see to it that it is obeyed” (40).
Durkheim concludes the essay by making clear that the fundamental pathology of this
mentality is not simply collective insanity or brutal sadism, but rather lies in defining the State
via “a morbid hypertrophy of the will, a kind of will-mania” (44). For Durkheim, this idealism of
exaggerated sovereignty leads to the inability of Germany to accept the legitimacy of
international law, of the right of “lesser” States to exist, or even accept the existence of “equal”
States which might serve as rivals. This produces a “frenzied race to power” (43) which will
inevitably oblige Germany to attempt to outgrow any possible challenge which might come from
any external forces. This is the task set forth by the political idealism that Durkheim describes,
but remains impossible to realize for the individual. Rather, it is only achievable through the
State, in Treitschke’s formulation, due to its unique ability to harness these disparate individual
wills in order to direct them to the “supreme end” (45). Durkheim then pronounces the
philosophical underpinnings of the German mentality:
The State is the sole concrete and historic form possible to the Superman of whom
Nietzsche was the prophet and harbinger, and the German State must put forth all
its strength to become this Superman. The German State must be “über Allés”
(above all). Superior to all private wills, individual or collective, superior to the
moral laws themselves, without any law save that imposed by itself, it will be able
31

disClosure, Vol. 29: Populism

Eland and de Pontes

to triumph over all resistance and rule by constraint, when it cannot secure
voluntary acceptance (Durkheim 1915, 45).
This absolute superiority of the State, above all other individual or collective wills, admits no
possibility of the critique which emanates from exteriority. By subordinating all wills, even
morality itself, to the one task of increasing its power, the State not only becomes a personality
characterized by its desire for unity, order and organization, but it becomes the only possible
concrete personality.
The association of the German mentality of aggressive nationalism to the philosophy of
Nietzsche is, at best, a highly selective reading of Nietzsche’s concept of will to power, and must
necessarily ignore Nietzsche’s critique of mass culture and the herd mentality that would
subordinate individual wills to any kind of collective will, including the State. Clearly Durkheim
is not offering a particularly nuanced reading of Nietzsche as a social theorist, but this does reveal
an important dimension of Durkheim’s reading of Treitschke as the culmination not only of a
particular political ideology but more fundamentally as the conclusion of a particular line of
philosophical thinking. This mentality, which Durkheim associates with both Nietzsche and
Machiavelli, rests on the subordination of all individual wills to a general will for the sake of
increasing the power of the State.
Ultimately, Durkheim concludes his essay optimistically, noting: “When all the nations
whose existence it threatens or disturbs — and they are legion — combine against it, it will be
unable to resist them, and the world will be set free” (47) That optimistic view, in 1915, could not
have anticipated the events of the next three years of the First World War, let alone the horrors
that played out over the rest of the first half of the twentieth century and still persist in similar
forms of “political idealism” well into the twenty-first century.
“Elementary Feelings” and the Degenerate Germanic Ideal of Man
Durkheim’s analysis of Treitschke’s nationalism takes on renewed relevance when we
observe that contemporary forms of authoritarian populism have merely substituted Donald
Trump’s “America First” for Oswald Mosley’s “Britain First” or Jair Bolsonaro’s “Brazil Above
All, God Above Everyone” for the “Germany Above All” embodied by Treitschke. But in order
to understand the deep pathology at play within the xenophobic and jingoistic rhetoric deployed
by these authoritarian figures, which has historically been deployed with extraordinary success
by nationalistic populist movements, we can turn to the work of Emmanuel Levinas. Levinas,
like Heller, lost much of his family in the Holocaust and his work bares the mark of his own
internment in a Nazi prison camp. Levinas’s work is especially important for this task because
he addresses politics at the level of underlying philosophical commitments, specifically focusing
on the way philosophy has come to be singularly consumed with questions of ontology, which
has left it vulnerable to this particular pathology. Levinas’s work also emphasizes, as did
Durkheim’s analysis of Treitschke, that political manifestations of this ideology cannot be
addressed purely at the level of political rationality but must rather engage it as a matter of social
metaphysics.
The influence of Durkheim’s thought on Levinas’s phenomenological project has been
thoroughly documented by Howard Caygill in his 2002 book Levinas and the Political, which
stresses the role of Durkheim’s conception of the sacred on Levinas’s later phenomenology.
32

disClosure, Vol. 29: Populism

Eland and de Pontes

Caygill relies largely on the widely circulated interviews with Philippe Nemo from 1981, in which
Levinas addresses not only his mature philosophical positions but the range of influences which
contributed to his unique approach to philosophical questions. These interviews represent an
especially important moment in Levinas’s reflection on his own thought and are an indispensable
resource for interpreting the political and social context of the pluralism evoked in the conclusion
of Totality and Infinity.
One of the important characteristics of the largely informal interviews, which were
subsequently collected and republished as Ethics and Infinity, is that Levinas makes a clear
connection between his metaphysical project and the broader social context to which that project
attempts to respond. This brings him to address the social dimension of his philosophical thought
in much greater detail than in his more formal philosophical writings. It is in this context that in
response to Nemo’s question “Do you put the sociological thought of a Durkheim on the same
level as the properly philosophical thought of a Bergson?,” Levinas offers effusive praise for the
famed sociologist:
Apparently, Durkheim was inaugurating an experimental sociology. But his work
also appeared as a ‘rational sociology,’ as an elaboration of the fundamental
categories of the social, as what one would call today an ‘eidetic of society,’
beginning with the leading idea that the social does not reduce to the sum of
individual psychologies. Durkheim, a metaphysician! The idea that the social is
the very order of the spiritual, a new plot in being above the animal and human
psychism; the level of ‘collective representations’ defined with vigor and which
opens up the dimension of spirit in the individual life itself, where the individual
alone comes to be recognized and even redeemed. In Durkheim there is, in a sense,
a theory of ‘levels of being,’ of the irreducibility of these levels to one another, an
idea which acquires its full meaning within the Husserlian and Heideggerian
context (Levinas 1985, 26-27).
That Levinas considers Durkheim to be a great philosophical thinker on par with the titans of the
philosophical canon can help us understand how to deploy his work practically in the context of
populist exclusionary nationalism that occupies us here. Levinas even seems to suggest that he
remained skeptical as to whether the phenomenological approach of his mentors could function
without the import of concepts more accessible via Durkheim’s experimental sociology. For
Levinas, Durkheim provides the foundation for a critique of phenomenology itself by insisting
on the irreducibility of levels of sociality, that is, on the irreducibility of social life to the actions
or consciousness of individual subjects. It is exactly this irreducibility, the radical alterity which
cannot be accounted for within the frameworks of Husserlian or Heideggerian phenomenology,
that Durkheim’s work lays bare. This helps clarify the context in which Levinas evokes Durkheim
against Heidegger in Totality and Infinity, when he utilizes Durkheim’s social metaphysics as a
way to escape from Heidegger’s solipsism. Levinas notes:
… for Heidegger intersubjectivity is a coexistence, a we prior to the I and the other,
a neutral intersubjectivity. The face to face both announces a society, and permits
the maintaining of a separated I. Durkheim already in one respect went beyond
this optical interpretation of the relation with the other in characterizing society
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by religion. I relate to the Other only across Society, which is not simply a
multiplicity of individuals or objects ; I relate to the Other who is not simply a part
of a Whole, nor a singular instance of a concept. To reach the Other through the
social is to reach him through the religious. Durkheim thus gives an indication of
a transcendence other than that of the objective (Levinas 1979, 68).
Levinas will go on to oppose Durkheim’s reduction of religion to observable and quantifiable
practices and rituals, which is necessitated by the positivistic methodology of his experimental
sociology. But Durkheim’s central insight which Levinas identifies and praises in Totality and
Infinity, and again 20 years later in the Nemo interviews, is that this social metaphysics avoids
the solipsistic trappings of existential phenomenology by viewing the social as beyond the scope
of ontology.
As such, it might not be surprising that when faced with Heidegger’s embrace of National
Socialism in 1933, Levinas evoked terminology drawn directly from Durkheim’s conception of
“elementary forms” in accounting for “elementary feelings” which had been awakened by
populist discourse directed at the German people. As one of Heidegger’s most thoroughly
devoted disciples, Levinas was especially shaken by his mentor’s political commitment. But while
his work never addresses Heidegger’s politics commitment directly, his entire philosophical
project can be read as an attempt to rehabilitate thinking itself in such a way as to avoid its
vulnerability to the particular pathology that engulfed the German people and even Heidegger
himself. To this end, the crucial text that provides the key context to Levinas’ later formal work
is his 1934 “Reflections on the Philosophy of Hitlerism.” This text is especially relevant for our
purposes here as it draws out the crucial connection between the pathology diagnosed by
Durkheim in Treitschke’s nationalism and the particular manifestation of that nationalism two
decades later under the banner of National Socialism, which has emerged again in our time under
various terms for authoritarian populism.
The short text of Levinas’s reflections is remarkable for a number of reasons. With the
benefit of historical hindsight, it is easy to underestimate the penetrating nature of Levinas’
perception of the pathology of Hitlerism early in its development. At a point in history in which
western democracies were unsure what to make of the emerging politics of fascism, and a full
decade before the full extent of the horrors of the Holocaust began to come to light, Hitler was
widely seen to be a somewhat aggressive politician fighting against the political and economic
woes of the Weimar Republic, not unlike many aspiring tyrants of our own contemporary
political climate such as Orbán. In the same sense as current movements in nationalist or
authoritarian populism are commonly perceived, at the time there was no general sense of
urgency as the horrors that would come to light after the war were unprecedented and
unimaginable. Even as the nation-States of western Europe pursued a doomed strategy of
appeasement, naively hoping for the “Peace for our time” which would be prematurely declared
by Neville Chamberlain in 1938, Levinas immediately perceived the threat and underlying
pathology within the rise of Hitlerism.
Still drawing heavily on Heidegger’s language from Being and Time, Levinas writes in his
Reflections on Hitlerism: “Time, which is a condition of human existence, is above all a condition
that is irreparable. The fait accompli, swept along by a fleeing present, forever evades man's
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control, but weighs heavily on his destiny” (Levinas 1990, 65). Levinas emphatically opposes the
subordination of individual freedom within the logic of Hitlerism, but also outlines the
problematic conception of freedom within liberal politics as placing “the human spirit on a plane
that is superior to reality, and so creates a gulf between man and the world” (66). This radical
division of man and world is at the heart of what Levinas will go on to denounce as “the Germanic
ideal of man” which is the necessary framework of Hitlerism’s false promise of sincerity and
authenticity (70). Levinas’s denunciation of this degenerate Germanic ideal is undertaken in the
name of defending civilization itself. He notes that under the spell of this degenerate Germanic
ideal, “Civilization is invaded by everything that is not authentic, by a substitute that is put at the
service of fashion and of various interests… Such a society loses living contact with its true ideal
of freedom and accepts degenerate forms of the ideal” (70).
At the core of the short essay we find a compelling case against not only the politics and
philosophy of Hitlerism, but Levinas’s attempt to describe a conception of the social which
opposes this degenerate Germanic ideal. Skepticism and nihilism are attributed to this same
mentality and are seen as the awakening of elementary feelings and “secret nostalgia” within the
German soul. Levinas would later write, in a 1990 prefatory note to the article, that his interest in
writing these reflections in 1934 was to oppose the tendency of understanding the rise of
Hitlerism as some sort of collective madness or anomaly within human reason, but rather to
expose the “elemental Evil into which we can be led by logic and against which Western
philosophy had not sufficiently insured itself” (63). Clearly in 1934 Levinas could not have
anticipated the scale this elemental Evil would reach over the next decade, but his early account
of Hitlerism already anticipated the way in which the degenerate Germanic ideal necessarily
undermines “the very humanity of man” (71). The fundamental core of Hitlerian racist ideology
is not primarily anti-Semitism, but rather a skepticism towards “[a]ny rational assimilation or
mystical communion between spirits that is not based on a community of blood…” (70). For
Levinas, the core of racism lies in accepting the principle that “[u]niversality must give way to
the idea of expansion…” (Levinas 1990, 70) If we are to read Levinas’ work as an attempt to create
an ethical response to the problem of evil, as suggested by Richard Bernstein (2004), it is important
to understand that the specific kind of evil that Levinas opposes is exactly what he refers to here
as the degenerate Germanic ideal. While his earlier work did not elaborate this critique in the
context of opposition to Heideggerian ontology, there is a clear overlap in the way he views this
Germanic ideal as the negation of social pluralism and Heidegger’s ontology as the negation of
metaphysical pluralism.
Levinas’s article on Hitlerism, which we should remember was written only 19 years after
Durkheim’s pamphlet on Treitschke, offers both condemnation of the rise of fascism as well as a
lamentation of liberalism’s failure to resist the pathological Germany mentality. Levinas
demonstrates a remarkable interest in the political reaction to the fundamental social changes
which accompany the shift from pre-modern to modern society, or to use Durkheim’s technical
vocabulary, in the shift from mechanical solidarity to organic solidarity. Levinas does not
approach this question as a strictly sociological or political problem, but rather something which
is pervasive in the philosophical foundations of all modern society. Liberalism and fascism are
addressed as political movements derived from the modern conception of the human subject,
which is to say they both seek to understand the human condition strictly in terms of separation,
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or more specifically, in terms of their separateness from one another. Levinas notes:
The whole philosophical and political thought of modern times tends to place the
human spirit on a plane that is superior to reality, and so creates a gulf between
man and the world. It makes it impossible to apply the categories of the physical
world to the spirituality of reason, and so locates the ultimate foundation of the
spirit outside the brutal world and the implacable history of concrete existence
(Levinas 1990, 66).
For Levinas, Hitlerism signifies a rediscovering of a primal aspect of human existence that he
calls, in terms that echo Durkheim’s analysis of Treitschke, “the secret nostalgia within the
German soul” and represents “an awakening of elementary feelings [sentiments élémentaires]”
which “questions the very principles of a civilization” (64). This stirring of primal drives,
however, is not simply a matter of a return to a more primitive human nature as Freud would
have it, but rather is itself a product of social forces. Again, it is crucial to understand Levinas’s
philosophical analysis of Hitlerism in light of his affirmation in the 1990 prefatory note that
western ontological philosophy has left us unequipped to respond to the barbarism of this
elemental evil, especially in regards to Heidegger’s project of fundamental ontology.
This interest in “elemental forms”, both in the prefatory note and the original article,
indicate profound connection to Durkheim at the core of Levinas’s understanding of the political
sphere. Levinas repeatedly evokes Durkheim’s phraseology in referring to the elementary force
[force élémentaire] of the simplistic [primaire] philosophy of Hitler, and the way it awakened these
elementary feelings [sentiments élémentaires] within the German people. The way in which these
repeated references derive their terminology from Durkheim’s examination of “elementary
forms” has been extensively explored by Caygill, emphasizing Levinas’s insistence on the
paganistic religiosity at the core of social life within Germany. Levinas notes: “For these
elementary feelings harbor a philosophy. They express a soul's principal attitude towards the
whole of reality and its own destiny. They predetermine or prefigure the meaning of the
adventure that the soul will face in the world” (64). By returning to the language of Durkheim’s
social metaphysics which he had encountered prior to studying under Husserl and Heidegger,
Levinas attempts to pronounce a fundamental conflict of modern society of which Hitlerism is
merely one instantiation. The philosophy of Hitlerism, he is clear to point out, cannot be reduced
to the philosophy of Hitlerians alone, but necessarily draws on the entire western philosophical
tradition leading up to that point. While Levinas required another 30 years to develop his critique
of ontology in Totality and Infinity, it is clear that he was already engaging at a fundamental level
with the themes that would go on to motivate his work throughout the rest of his life.
Conclusion
One of the defining features of contemporary forms of populism is a distinct attempt to
appeal to nationalist sentiment. Nationalism, as the antithesis of globalism or universalism, rests
on a conception of the state as inherently self-contained and isolated from its neighbors in a
radical way. The most recent rise of authoritarian populism is fundamentally inseparable from
the constant appeals to national heritage or cultural identity that are declared to be under siege
by nefarious forces of globalist hegemony. It is unsurprising that this global hegemony is often
presented in anti-Semitic tones, often focusing specifically on the role of George Soros in global
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politics. This paper has argued that we can understand the dynamics at play in this emergence of
nationalist identity politics by examining the way this pathology has been diagnosed and
addressed in the sociological tradition by Durkheim and in the philosophical tradition by
Levinas.
Heller’s observation on the difficulty in identifying Orbán as a populist, with which we
began this investigation, rests on a conception of populism which distances its philosophical
meaning from its historical manifestations. In illustrating that while Orbán uses nationalistic
vocabulary and rhetoric, to mobilize hatred against foreigners, Heller remains clearly aware that
these are traditional methods that authoritarian populists have long used to gain and maintain
power. But, continuing her analysis, Heller notes that it is difficult even to describe Orbán as
“right-wing” because his naked pursuit of power is not beholden to any political ideology beyond
his own ambition and lust for increased power. But this is crucial to understanding the populist
mechanism at play in the work of an aristocrat like Treitschke, who deploys anti-Semitic
nationalist rhetoric instrumentally to achieve a particular end, which is increasing the power of
the State. Levinas’ work helps us understand not only how this rhetoric is deployed in a specific
attempt to manifest resentment by drawing on the “elementary feelings” of tribalistic
nationalism, but also how this degenerate mentality is deeply rooted within western philosophy
itself.
Perhaps the most compelling aspect of Durkheim’s analysis of Treitschke, at least for the
context of contemporary questions of populism, is the necessary union of social solidarity and
consequent political forms of exclusionary nationalism. To be clear, Durkheim’s interest in
Treitschke is not limited to a strictly political conception of the State, but rather addresses the
interplay between social hegemony and the concrete political incarnation of this phenomenon as
the unrestrained sovereignty of nationalism. While it might be tempting to exclude this social
order and draw a direct connection between the State’s lust for power and the fascist movements
of the twentieth century, that would necessarily risk ignoring work of nationalists like Treitschke
whose work predates fascism by decades. This is precisely why Durkheim’s sociological analysis
of pre-fascist nationalism is so vital to the current historical moment as contemporary populist
movements demand their disparate nation-states abandon international accords and reject all
forms of solidarity other than “blood and soil.”
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